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Abstract
Academic attention to the central bankʼs retained proﬁts has been scarce, although their
magnitudes are nontrivial. This paper conﬁrms that the proﬁts retained as a reserve fund, if
combined with unconstrained bureaucratic discretion, can engender inﬂationary bias. This result
is intriguing because the previous literature emphasizes a similar distortion in monetary policy
for the opposite case where those proﬁts are turned over to the Treasury. We therefore propose
that some external changes in central-banking institutions alone may not warrant their desired
ʻoutcomeʼ without reining in excessive discretion. This proposition can provide a beneﬁcial
implication for establishing the meaningful independence of central banks.
Keywords: retained proﬁts, central banking, transparency, bureaucratic discretion, inﬂationary
bias
JEL Classiﬁcation: D73, K42, E58
I. Introduction
Most central banks in the world at least partially retain their proﬁts inside. Our pilot
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＊＊ Corresponding author.survey reveals that many central banks have large amounts of retained proﬁts, although they
oﬃcially use diﬀerent titles for that fund, for instance, reserve fund, general reserve, or rest
fund (the reserve fund hereafter). More speciﬁcally, the amounts of the reserve fund in some
countries were huge (for instance, as a ʻproportion to the monetary baseʼ), but the worldwide
distribution of the proportion was dispersed: As of 2005, Iceland (38%), the UK (3%)a n d
Germany (1%) in Europe, Indonesia (14%), Japan (2%), Korea (13%) and Philippines (51%)i n
Asia, and Venezuela (5%), the US (2%) and Australia (20%) in America and Oceania, to name
a few. It seems, however, that few researchers have paid attention to this chunk of central
bank-led funds.
Relevant statutory provisions of the central banks in many countries usually identify the
role of this monetary institution as “preparing for potential losses.” Nonetheless, we ﬁnd them
unconvincing to a certain extent. Firstly, we suspect that the current balances of the reserve
fund in some countries might be too large for the actual losses.
1 Secondly, and far more
importantly, we contend that even on the occurrence of losses the government, rather than its
central bank, should in principle be responsible for them from the conventional public-ﬁnance
perspective.
2 In fact, a simple T-account analysis shows that there is no change in the size of
the monetary base whether the central bank or the government makes up the losses. This result
insinuates that it makes essentially no diﬀerence to the credibility of the central bank.
3
Intriguingly enough, we have noticed that the reserve fund in the central bank is not just
sitting in its vault, but is continuously managed in and out. In an ensuing inquiring process
from the political-economic standpoint,
4 we encountered an intriguing argument by Chant and
Acheson (1972) made already in the early 1970s.
5 All these ultimately led us to a hypothesis
that the incentive to expand the reserve fund might cause inﬂationary bias, at the margin, if
combined with unconstrained bureaucratic discretion concerning its management.
The purpose of the current comparative analysis lies in a ﬁrst-time veriﬁc a t i o no ft h e
relationship between the central bank reserve fund and inﬂation. We believe that this research
will provide useful insights to a host of countries. In particular, meaningful ʻtransparencyʼ in
central-banking institutions will be highlighted.
6
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1 According to our extended survey of 61 countries to be explained later, the Bank of Korea, for instance, had a
reserve fund of $4,154 million in 2001, which was 17% of the monetary base. However, the total accumulation of ten-
time actual losses, incurred over 40 years since the reserve fundʼs introduction, had been only $2,953 million up to the
moment of completing the collection of our data to be used in Section III.
2 For instance, §38 of the Law of the Peopleʼs Bank of China stipulates: “Losses sustained by the People’s Bank of
China shall be made up by appropriations from the State Treasury.”
3 As for this T-account analysis, refer to Kim and Kim (2007) highlighting the relevant institutions of Korea, while
its analytic result can be generalized with no diﬃculty.
4 The overall political-economic perspective on central banking was launched in full force from the 1970s, and the
literature generally distinguishes these political-economic models into four diﬀerent types; public interests models,
presidential partisan models, congressional partisan models, and public choice models. The current paper might be
regarded as belonging to the public choice models, the related examples of which would include Chant and Acheson
(1972), Toma (1982), Kane (1982), Shughart and Tollison (1983), Boyes et al. (1988), Havrilesky and Granato (1993),
Caporale and Grier (1998), Broz and Frieden (2001), van Rixtel (2002), Bearce (2003), Kim and Kim (2005, 2008),
Crowe and Meade (2008), and de Haan et al. (2007, 2008), etc.
5 “The theory of bureaucracy traditionally assumes that a bureau is concerned with prestige and self-
preservation .... [Accordingly,] a preference ordering that stresses these concerns to a central bank throws
considerable light on the actual operation of monetary policy.” (Chant and Acheson, 1972, p.14, [] added).
6 See a special issue of The Manchester School (2003, v.71, issue 5) and a more recent one of European Journal ofFor this purpose, in Section II we ﬁrst examine the (orthodox) notion that such reserve
funds should be completely independent of any inﬂationary bias, at least from a legislative
point of view. We then submit the hypothesis that, if the discretionary power of central bank
authorities is not eﬀectively controlled, the incentive to expand reserve funds can result in
inﬂationary bias. In Section III, we test, using international data, the main hypothesis that an
increase in the reserve fund causes inﬂationary bias ceteris paribus. Finding solid evidence to
support this hypothesis could cast critical implications for establishing meaningful independence
of many central banks, i.e., including independence from the ʻinternal bureaucratic distortion,ʼ
not just from the (usual) ʻexternal pressures.ʼ That would reinforce the argument underlying, for
instance, Crowe and Meade (2008) and de Haan et al. (2008), that the central bank
independence, as part of central bankʼs governance arrangements, needs to be complemented by
transparency and accountability for its eﬀective working. Finally, Section IV summarizes the
discussions and suggests imminent future studies.
II. Retained Proﬁts and Inﬂationary Bias: A Potential Nexus
1. Their Mutual Independence Conjectured by Relevant Legal Provisions
From the legislative point of view, the central bankʼs retained proﬁts as a reserve fund
should be independent of any inﬂationary or deﬂationary bias. TABLE 1 reports our own pilot
survey of thirty countries where their relevant legal documents were available in English. We
ﬁrst detect that the selected countries, at the major statutory-Acts level governing their own
central banks, provide the oﬃcial titles of retained proﬁts, their purposes, or allocation formula
from annual proﬁts. Some countries such as Croatia, Indonesia, and Korea deﬁne more than a
single-type reserve fund.
Only thirteen out of the thirty countries explicitly identify the goals of their reserve fund.
They are mostly associated with “covering some types of losses.” The losses are not completely
detailed out in the relevant clauses, but appear to be understood as including a very broad set
of losses from varying operations of central banking. As to the other seventeen countries in
TABLE 1 that do not specify explicit purposes, although we exerted eﬀorts to scrutinize the
entire Acts to deduce some implicit intention, we could not identify any. The use of this fund
seems to be rather a mystery. Thus, at least from reading these legal provisions, we draw the
conclusion that the purpose of this monetary institution (i.e., reserve fund) should ʻneitherʼ lie in
any intention to change the domestic inﬂation level ʻnorʼ relate to an inﬂationary eﬀect.
2. Evaluating the Argument for the Inﬂation-Deterring Eﬀect
Due to language barriers, it was inherently diﬃcult to investigate legal documents below
the Act level in many countries regarding this public fundʼs purpose. However, we discovered a
somewhat provocative argument in a major publication by the Bank of Korea (BOK). Although
A MACRO-ECONOMIC CONSEQUENCE OF THE CENTRAL BANK’S RESERVE FUND: 2011] 145
Political Economy (2007, v.23, issue 1) for this topic. Gerrats (2006), in an excellent survey paper on central bank
transparency, deﬁned the transparency as the absence of asymmetric information between monetary policy makers and














Bank of Thailand Act B.E. 2485 §9~12 Thailand
n.a. General Reserve Fund
Reserve Bank Act 1959 §29
Monetary Authority of Singapore Act §6 Singapore
“Cover general risks, exchange




“set aside for contingencies”
Bank of Slovenia Act §6 Slovenia
Law on the Bank of Albania §9
n.a.
Country
Reserve Fund Sveriges Riksbank Act, Chap.10 §4
n.a. Reserve from Proﬁts
Bank Act 1998 Articles of Association of De
Nederlandsche Bank n.v., §19
Netherlands
Australia
n.a. Reserve Capital Act on The National Bank of Poland §60~62 Poland
Law on The Central Bank of Turkey §59










Law Concerning the Monetary Status and the
Central Bank of Luxembourg §31
Luxembourg
n.a. General Reserve Fund Central Bank of Malaysia Act 1958 §7 Malaysia
n.a. Reserve
TABLE 1. LEGAL TITLES AND LEGISLATIVE PURPOSES OF CENTRAL BANK RETAINED
PROFITS FOR THIRTY SELECTED COUNTRIES
Banco de Mexico Law §53 Mexico
Act No.23/ 1999 on Bank Indonesia §62 Indonesia
“Charge any net losses” General Reserve Fund Bank of Jamaica Act §9 Jamaica




Bank of Korea Act §99~100 Korea
Albania
“Cover the loss”
Czech National Council Act No. 6/1993 §25~26 Czech Rep.
n.a.
Reserve Capital, Special
Capital and Special Funds
Law on the Central Bank of the Republic of
Estonia §25, 27
Estonia
“oﬀset falls in value and cover
other losses”
Statutory Reserve Bundesbank Act §27 Germany




Bank of Canada Act §27 Canada
“Oﬀset any deﬁcit” Reserves
Constitutional Organic Act of the Central
Bank of Chile §77
Chile
n.a. General Reserve Law of the Peopleʼs Bank of China §38 China













Organic Act of the National Bank of
Belgium §30~33
Belgium
“Cover uncollectable and doubtful
receivables, and the Bank’s losses”
Statutory Fund &
Reserve Fund
Law on the Bulgarian National Bank §7~8 Bulgaria
n.a. Rest Fundthe BOK Act formally identiﬁed, as the reserve fundʼs goal, “preparing for losses”i nT A B L E
1, BOK assigned another goal: “The monetary base is scaled down by the retained proﬁts,
while the ﬁscal use of them [if transferred to the Treasury as general taxes] increases the
monetary base (BOK, 1999, p.277, [] added) .” Nonetheless, the conventional T-account
examination has persuaded us that BOKʼs so called ʻinﬂation-deterring eﬀectʼ is groundless.
7
In summary, one might derive a normative conclusion that the central bankʼs retained
proﬁts are not supposed to inﬂuence inﬂation in any systematic way. In other words, it should
not change the monetary base, according to this conventional scrutiny in the current subsection,
as well as the legislative intents illustrated in Section II.1. We now turn to observations by
which one can reasonably suspect that there exists an undeniable caveat against this traditional
wisdom. The aforementioned normative conclusion then becomes rather sophomoric.
3. Bureaucratic Discretion, Reserve Fund, and Inﬂationary Bias
The existence of excessive discretion is recognized in much of the literature on political-
economic analyses of central banks mentioned in the Introduction. The early work by Chant
and Acheson (1972) was illuminating in that they provided vivid examples concerning why and
how such uncontrolled discretion is actually exercised in everyday operation within the central
bank.
8
From the current paperʼs theme in particular, Shughart and Tollison (1983) is another
inspiring study. They showed how central bank bureaucratsʼ incentives were used to beneﬁt
themselves in allocating the Fedʼs earnings each year. Central bank proﬁts, after paying out
expenses, can be either turned in to the Treasury or retained inside. The US is a representative
example of the former.
9
Shughart and Tollison plead that the constraint of returning proﬁts to the Treasury since
1947 has induced the Fed to ʻpadʼ its operating expenditures by increasing the number of
employees on its payroll or by over-purchasing amenities. In order to support these bureaucratic
incentives, the authors articulate, the Fed will try to maximize its revenues by the expansionary
open market operations, resulting in inﬂationary bias. They then empirically proved that “one
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7 Refer to Kim and Kim (2007) also for this T-account analysis refuting the BOKʼs claim.
8 For instance, the Bank of Canada used to utilize government deposits for maintaining and strengthening its
discretionary power: its use of arbitrary transfers of government deposits between itself and the chartered banks. Chant
and Acheson (1972, p.28) argue that the practice has a clearer rationale in terms of bureaucratic behavior rather than in
relation to monetary control. In particular, we were inspired by the authorsʼ assertions that a signiﬁcant advantage of
this practice is ʻgreater covertnessʼ relative to open market operations, and that this greater covertness renders a higher
degree of discretionary power. Meanwhile, we believe that such covertness (and informality) can be greatly reinforced
by practices such as amakudari from the central bank to private banks. See, for example, van Rixtel (2002) and Cho
and Kim (2001) for pervasive amakudari especially up to the 1990s in Japan and Korea, respectively.
9 The Federal Reserve Act of 1914 stated that the Fed ﬁrst were to use earnings for paying their expenses and for
paying dividends to member banks. Then, half of their yearly net earnings were to be paid to the government in the
form of a franchise tax. The other half could be retained by the Fed as long as its surplus was less than 40% of paid-
in capital. However, over the period of 1933-1947, all earnings could legally be spent or retained by the Fed (Toma,
1982, p.165). According to Toma (1982, p.166), these excess earnings sparked congressional interest, which the Fed
feared might be expressed in the form of a legislative measure, mandating a particular disposition of excess earnings;
this fear, at least partially, accounted for the Fedʼs ʻvoluntaryʼ transfer of a large portion of its revenue to the Treasury
in 1947. Boyes et al. (1988, pp.182-183) argue that, fearing legislative sanctions, the Fed began to submit most of its
earnings above system expenses to the Treasury, a practice that continues to this day.motivation for expansions in the money supply is to ﬁnance the growth of the Fed’ s
bureaucracy” (Shughart and Tollison, 1983, p.291). Furthermore, in a similar context, Toma
(1982, p.190) contends that “Federal Reserve oﬃcials beneﬁtf r o mi n ﬂation. As a supply side
phenomenon, inﬂation is a predictable consequence of an institutional structure that ties Fed
revenue to bond holdings.”
Intriguingly enough, we propose that inﬂationary bias can also take place in the polar-
opposite case of the related institution. The size of this reserve fund is enormous in many
countries and, as discussed before, there certainly exists ambiguity in its actual use. Naturally,
to the extent that central bank bureaucrats possess enough discretionary power, the reserve fund
can equally be utilized to maximize their own private interests at the margin. One
representative way is by arbitrarily allocating the fund to discounted loans, which have been
shown in the literature to be under signiﬁcant inﬂuence by the monetary authorityʼs discretion
in a way to meet its bureaucratic incentives (representatively, Poole, 1990; Schwartz, 1992).
10
This being the case, a very similar argument regarding inﬂationary bias above would hold: they
would try to maximize proﬁts by expansionary monetary policy to have a larger reserve fund,
and it can result in inﬂationary bias.
4. Central Bankʼs Governance and Excessive Discretionary Power
As mentioned before, the reserve fund is incessantly managed in and out. If its usage in
normal times is not being stipulated by the Acts, one may presume that the bureaucratic
incentives might intervene after all. We thus particularly underscore that bureaucrats would
prefer a bigger size of the reserve fund only if they possess the leeway to utilize it to their own
beneﬁt. To put it diﬀerently, substantial discretionary power is a pre-requisite for the reserve
fund to embark on the inﬂationary-bias-triggering nexus. In that context, we conjecture that the
magnitude of discretionary power is directly related to the ʻoverall governanceʼ of central
banks.
11
In fact, central banks have become more independent over the past two decades as
documented persuasively by Cukierman (2008). In response to this change, the demand for
transparency has also increased to reconcile the imperative of accountability consideration with
the need to guide the expectations of ﬁnancial market participants. Of course, all these
ʻtransparency and accountabilityʼ measures would largely characterize the overall governance.
Consequently, many central banks these days, if to varying degrees, are indeed constrained by
their publicly-announced policy objectives (notably concerning the monetary index or targeted
rate of inﬂation) or obligations to explain to the public what they do and why.
Nonetheless, there are countries where such measures are yet to be suﬃcient.
12 After all,
we always have to be aware of the ʻdiscretion-maximizing motive,ʼ which is the fundamental
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10 In fact, Kim and Kim (2007), based on about 40-year time series data of the Bank of Korea, veriﬁed such causal
relationship between the reserve fund and discount windows.
11 The literature on central bankʼs governance has grown rapidly from the early 2000s. See, among others, Schiﬀman
(2004), Lybek and Morris (2004), Tuladhar (2005), Amtenbrink, F. (2005), Crowe and Meade (2007), Kaufmann and
Kraay (2008), Kaufmann et al. (2009), and Ortiz (2009).
12 Refer, for example, Crowe and Meade (2007) for a comprehensive survey. Even in the presence of proper de jure
measures, however, there can be wide gaps between the expected and actual operations if either the government will
not support the laws or the central bank itself does not comply with them.aspect that crosscuts all bureaus, as has been argued persuasively àl aNiskanen (1975) .
13
Central banks are not an exception as clearly observed by the many public-choice models
focusing on central banks that were introduced in Section I. The bottom line is that a non-
trivial number of central banks can and may possess excessive discretionary power if the strict
transparency and accountability measures are not imposed eﬀectively.
Moreover, another problem still looms large. We submit that corruption also would make
bureaucratic discretion ʻmore permissibleʼ as part of the social culture or norms: corruption
would pervade an epidemic of bureaucratic discretion. This submission is based on a casual
observation that people in a corrupt society tend to have uncertainty in every aspect of their
businesses that involves any government regulation. In a sense, this speculation of ours of a
cultural nature might be consistent with Klitgaardʼs (1988, p.41) keen-edged economic account
of the ʻnefarious incentive eﬀectʼ throughout an entire society. It is in this very context that
Kaufmann et al. (2009, p.6), in accurately evaluating the central bankʼs governance, emphasized
the aspect of ʻcontrol of corruptionʼ that captures the perceptions of the extent to which public
power is exercised for private gain.
In conclusion, the degree of discretionary power is believed to be mainly determined by
ʻtransparencyʼ and ʻaccountabilityʼ measures on the one hand, and the general level of
ʻcorruptionʼ in the society on the other. Further, the degree appears to be essential in explaining
the relationship between the reserve fund and the inﬂationary bias. All in all, we posit that the
supposedly ʻindependentʼ relationship between the two variables, which was derived in the
earlier subsections, might not be warranted in practice. It thus provides an explicit motivation
for the ensuing section, viz., that an empirical investigation utilizing the aforementioned
primary determinants of discretionary power is imperative.
III. Empirical Analysis by International Comparisons
1. The Data
We now empirically test the hypothesis that a bigger reserve fund, if combined with
discretionary power, could cause inﬂationary bias.
14 To be sure, controlling for such
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13 In this regard, for instance, it is shown theoretically in Berger et al. (2001) that even an independent central bank,
if it has the same preferences as the government, will behave in the same way. While such emphasis on the central
bankʼs ʻpreference,ʼ originating representatively from scholar such as Rogoﬀ (1985), is relevant to our argument in
question, we believe, on the contrary, that the assumption of identical preferences usually holds just because of the very
nature of bureaucracy.
14 One can alternatively think of testing the relationship between proﬁts and inﬂation, so that it would encompass
both Shughart and Tollisonʼs hypothesis (i.e., turning in proﬁts to the Treasury causes inﬂationary bias) and our
hypothesis (i.e., retaining proﬁts inside causes inﬂationary bias). However, we focus on the hypothesis in the text for
the following two reasons. First, we intend to verify the eﬀect of the reserve fund per se which could be hardly inferred
from legislative documents as shown in TABLE 1. Secondly, our own scrutiny suggests that the bureaucratic
discretionary power can be better exercised with a stock variable (i.e., reserve fund) than with a ﬂow variable (i.e.,
proﬁts). This is mainly because bureaucrats can get away with a ʻpublicity and/or outside monitoring constraintʼ more
eﬀectively through using the reserve fund as a safe harbor. Such constraints to bureaucrats are believed to exist
obviously; for instance, the Monetary Authority of Singapore Act §15 strictly rules that “No salary fee wage or other
remuneration or allowance paid by the Authority shall be computed by reference to the proﬁts of the Authority.”HITOTSUBASHI JOURNAL OF ECONOMICS [December 150
Furthermore, as explained in Section II, the Fedʼs voluntary decision to transfer proﬁts to the Treasury was also due to



































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































.bureaucratic discretion (i.e., accountability, transparency, and corruption) to substantiate its
eﬀect on inﬂation will be a major tenet of our empirical task.
APPENDIX.1 describes the data collection process, sources, and major sampling rules for
the reserve fund variable across 61 countries for ﬁscal years 2000 and 2001.
15 The reason for
choosing this data period is also explained. For other variables, detailed explanations regarding,
for instance, the sources and calculations are provided in APPENDIX.2.
FIG.1 displays the ratio of the reserve fund to the monetary base of the 61 countries. It is
clear that the existence of the reserve fund is universal, and that the worldwide distribution of
the reserve fund ratios is fairly broad. Our early attempts to categorize the ratios by region or
economic development levels were not particularly productive. For instance, the top-ten ratio
sub-sample includes ﬁve developed countries as deﬁned by the IMF (i.e., Iceland, Denmark,
Sweden, Norway and, Austria), while there are also ﬁve developed countries (i.e., Spain,
Canada, Switzerland, Israel and, the US) in the bottom-ten ratio sub-sample.
2. Estimation Results
The Basic Model
To test the main hypothesis with this data, we start from the basic regression equation of
inﬂation with the traditional fundamentals adopted from the literature as control variables
(Fundamentals), and add to them the reserve fund variable (Reserve) as in equation (1). Time is
a dummy to control the year diﬀerence.
Inﬂationi, t=a+b}Fundamentalsi, t+g}Reservei, t+d}Timet+ei, t
where i=each country, and t=2000 and 2001. (1)
In the existing research on the cross-sectional inﬂation performance, the following six
economic or political factors seem to be typically present, and are thus included in
Fundamentals.
16 i) Trade-openness (Trade_openness): Romer (1993) argues that the beneﬁts of
surprise inﬂation are a decreasing function of the degree of trade openness. ii) Exchange rate
regime (Ex.rate_peg): Exchange rate pegs act as a disciplining device, allowing policy makers
in countries with a high inﬂation propensity to import credibility and, hence, lower inﬂation
from abroad (Husain et al., 2005).
17 iii) Per-capita income (Per.capita_income): Higher income
per capita as a general measure of development is likely to be accompanied by a more
sophisticated tax system and a more developed ﬁnancial system, both of which imply lower
optimal inﬂation tax (Campillo and Miron, 1996). iv) Political stability (Political_stability):
Cukierman et al. (1992) ﬁnd that inﬂation is high on average in countries that are politically
less stable because the decreased stability reduces policy makersʼ ability to pre-commit
economic policies. v) Government budget balance (Gov_budget): Deﬁcit governments have
incentive to monetize government spending (Al-Mahrubi and Willett, 1995). vi) Central bank
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15 Detailed information on each countryʼs reserve fund variable is available upon request.
16 Only one representative paper for each variable will be referred to because of a good accumulation of the related
literature.
17 There is also a public-choice view that the exchange rate regime can be endogenously determined by bureaucratsʼ
private interest, rather than the traditional view taking it as exogenous. See Kim and Kim (2005) for its empirical
veriﬁcation and more literature.independence (CB_independence): Klomp and de Haan (2010) among many others validates the
negative relationship between inﬂation and central bank independence using a meta-regression
analysis based on the existing 59 studies on this topic.
Inﬂation is transformed into the form of Inﬂation=p /( 1 +p)( w h e r ep is consumer price
index inﬂation) to reduce not only the heteroskedasticity of the regression error but the
inﬂuence of a few high inﬂation countries. Trade_openness is the sum of exports and imports
relative to GDP. Ex.rate_peg is a dummy that has the value of 1, 2 or 3 for the ﬂoating, the
intermediate, and the ﬁxed exchange rate regime, respectively, according to the IMF criteria.
18
Per.capita_income is the log of per-capita GDP in the constant US dollars of 1995. Political_
stability measures political stability facing each country where a higher score is associated with
lower political risk. Gov_budget represents government ﬁscal balance relative to GDP. CB_
independence is central bank independence index where a higher score is assigned to a more
independent central bank. Regarding Reserve,w et r i e dt w od i ﬀerent measures of the relative
magnitude of the reserve fund. One is the amount relative to M2 (=ReserveM), and the other is
the amount relative to the monetary base (=ReserveMB). Expected signs of coeﬃcient estimates
for Trade_openness, Ex.rate_peg, Per.capita_income, Political_stability, Gov_budget,a n dCB_
independence are all negative whereas, if our hypothesis holds, those for Reserve variables
(ReserveM or ReserveMB) should be positive.
It is noted that, for the eleven euro-countries in our data, the monetary policy is formulated
by the Governing Council of European Central Bank (ECB) and executed by the national
central banks under uniform terms and conditions; an individual central bank does not have
much discretion in monetary policy. Therefore, we treat those euro-countries as one entry in
estimation by averaging out for each variable, which consequently reduces the number of
observations from 61 to 51.
Before undertaking estimation, we ﬁrst checked the correlation coeﬃcients among the
explanatory variables to avoid a possible multicollinearity problem. TABLE 2 shows the
correlation coeﬃcients. Most of them seem to be acceptable except the rather high ﬁgure
between Per.capita_income and Political_stability. It was well expected, however, so we will
take this into account in our estimation.
TABLE 3 reports the various estimation results of equation (1). Models 1 to 4 show the
results when only the traditional fundamental variables are included (of course, a constant and
Time are included but not reported). In Model 1, because of multicollinearity, Per.capita_
income instead of Political_stability is used. Out of the ﬁve traditional variables included in
Fundamentals, three reveal statistical signiﬁcance with the expected signs, while the coeﬃcient
estimates of Trade_openness and CB_independence are not signiﬁcant. We tried a diﬀerent
measure of trade openness, the ratio of imports to GDP (Trade_openness1), in Model 2 as in
Romer (1993), but the result did not change.
19 Model 3 and Model 4 parallel Model 1 and
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18 The exchange rate regime classiﬁcation is obtained from the IMF’s Annual Report on Exchange Arrangements and
Exchange Restrictions.
19 In contrast to the papers in favor of Romer (1993), there is also a collection of research not supporting Romerʼs
ﬁnding empirically and theoretically (Temple, 2002; Granato et al., 2007, etc.). For example, Granato et al. (2007)
argue that the negative openness-inﬂation relation is not always found, depending on the governmentʼs aggressiveness in
economic stabilization. We also made eﬀorts to make sure of the accuracy of the CB_independence coeﬃcient.
Cukierman et al. (2002) could not ﬁnd the negative relationship between independence and inﬂation in developing
countries, so they emphasized the merit of distinguishing countries by economic developments in estimation. FollowingModel 2, respectively, except that Political_stability is substituted for Per.capita_income.
Overall, among the four equations from Models 1 to 4, Model 1 seems to ﬁt best because
it shows the highest adjusted R
2 and more signiﬁcance for each individual variable. Therefore,
Model 1 will be used as the ʻbase equationʼ for further study of the inﬂuence of the reserve
fund below.
We checked for the possibility of the endogeneity problem with the regressors, based on
Durbin-Wu-Hausman (DWH) test. Among the traditional regressors, Trade_openness, Ex.rate_
peg,a n dPer.capita_income have been typical exogenous regressors in the panel-data analyses
of the inﬂation in the literature (e.g., Crowe and Meade, 2008; Hussain et al., 2005;Romer,
1993; etc.) . Therefore, we focused rather on the other variables, Gov_budget and CB_
independence,i nM o d e l1 .
First, we instrumented the government budget balance (Gov_budget) through the use of a
lagged Gov_budget and the ratio of the government consumption to GDP, since the latter,
which represents the size of the government, would be correlated with Gov_budget.T h eDWH
statistic (c
2
(1)) was 0.41 and its p-value was 0.52. Second, as for central bank independence
(CB_independence), we used as instruments the variables of Law and Order (LAW)a n d
Bureaucracy Quality (BQ) from the PRS Group’s International Country Risk Guide (ICRG)
database. The variable, LAW, is an assessment of the strength and impartiality of the legal
system and popular observance of law. The variable, BQ, measures the institutional strength
and quality of the bureaucracy. The DWH statistic (c
2
(1)) then was 1.68 and its p-value was
0.19. Upon these DWH tests, no endogeneity problem with the regressors was corroborated.
In Models 5 and 6, ReserveM and ReserveMB are added respectively to the base equation,
Model 1, in order to test the hypothesis that a larger reserve fund causes inﬂationary bias. Our
main focus is on the coeﬃcients of ReserveM and ReserveMB, expectedly with a positive sign.
The absence of any endogeneity problem related to the reserve fund variables is conﬁrmed by
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their ﬁndings, we added to the equation an interaction variable of the advanced-country dummy and CB_independence,
but it was not fruitful and the advanced-country dummy interaction seemed to only cause the multicollinearity problem
with Per.capita_income.
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TABLE 2. CORRELATION COEFFICIENTS AMONG THE VARIABLES





0.39 0.02 0.19the DWH test.
20 The traditional fundamental variables do not change in their signs and
signiﬁcance levels upon including ReserveM or ReserveMB . However, the inﬂuence of the
reserve fund turns out to be mixed: Model 5 with ReserveM supports the hypothesis, while
Model 6 with ReserveMB does not.
This result appears to be unsatisfactory at ﬁrst glance. Upon further inspection, however, it
could have been well anticipated. In our hypothesis submitted earlier, the bureaucratic
discretionary power plays a key role working on the reserve fund, but it has not been taken
account of in our estimation yet. Incorporating it into the regression below comes as quite a
natural step for completely testing our main hypothesis.
Controlling for Discretionary Power: The Essence of the Argument
We now take up the important issue of bureaucratic discretionary power, which constitutes
a critical facet in our hypothesis: substantial discretionary power is imperative for the reserve
fund to embark on inﬂationary bias. We undertake this task by estimating equation (1) with the
reserve fund variable therein interacted with a ʻdiscretionary countryʼ dummy, i.e., a dummy for
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20 In Model 5, we instrumented ReserveM using a lagged ReserveM and a lagged Inﬂation. Then, the DWH statistic
(c
2
(1)) and its p-value were 0.0002 and 0.99, respectively. Again in Model 6, we instrumented ReserveMB using a
lagged ReserveMB and a lagged Inﬂation.T h eDWH statistic (c
2
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Note: Standard errors are in parentheses.
*,
**,a n d
*** represent the 10%,5 %, and 1% signiﬁcance, respectively. The
constant and Time coeﬃcients are not reported. Trade_openness is the sum of exports and imports relative to
GDP while Trade_openness1 is the imports relative to GDP.the group of countries with relatively more discretionary central banks. To deﬁne the
ʻdiscretionary countryʼ, we need ﬁrst a potentially good proxy of discretionary power.
We recognize that a standardized proxy of central bank discretionary power, which can be
unanimously acknowledged among scholars in the ﬁeld, will be unavailable for the time being.
Nevertheless, given this empirical barrier, we have experimentally chosen to utilize three
potential proxies, if not perfectly distinctive and/or exhaustive. They are directly capturing our
earlier discussion in Section II which bears on the main sources of such power.
First, a central bank transparency measure (Less_transparent: higher scores imply ʻless
transparencyʼ) from Fry et al. (2000, TABLE A.7: Policy explanation) is used as a proxy for the
discretionary power.
21 Less_transparent underscores the information published by the central
bank that can help the public to understand its policy, analysis, and forecasts.
22 It is thus
conjectured that the less information is revealed, the more discretionary power will be
exercised.
Second, higher accountability that is statutorily imposed upon central banks would tend to
constrain the scope and degree of bureaucratic discretionary power. Again Fry et al. (2000,
TABLE A.6: Accountability of the central bank to government/parliament) measured how far
the central bank as a government bureau has legal or informal responsibility to explain and
defend its policies to other government bodies. We use this accountability measure (Less_
accountable: higher scores imply ʻless accountabilityʼ) as another proxy for the discretionary
power.
Lastly, we exploit the Corruption Perceptions Index (Corrupt: higher scores imply ʻmore
corruptionʼ) from Transparency International,
23 under the aforementioned proposition that that a
societyʼs widespread corruption would pervade an epidemic of bureaucratic discretion among
most government agencies and oﬃcials.
24 We thus hypothesize that bureaucratic discretionary
power at central banks is likely to be positively correlated with this index.
Now, we make the ʻdiscretionary countryʼ dummies, Dless_transparent, DLess_accountable and
Dcorrupt, taking one if a countryʼs Less_transparent, Less_accountable and Corrupt exceed their
respective averages of the sample, and zero otherwise. Then, these dummies will be exploited
one by one, interacted with the reserve fund to test our hypothesis as in equation (2). Dummy is
the alternative ʻdiscretionary countryʼ dummy (Dless_transparent, DLess_accountable or Dcorrupt). We
also include Dummy itself as a regressor in equation (2), because it would be reasonable to
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21 Fry et al. (2000) provide measurements of a very extensive range of monetary framework characteristics of each
central bank, for example, policy focus on particular objectives, central bank independence, transparency, accountabil-
ity, etc. from their survey of 94 central banks.
22 de Haan et al. (2007) provides a good summary of the current state of knowledge in the ﬁeld of central bank
transparency and the eﬀectiveness of central bank communication.
23 We use the Corruption Perceptions Index of the year 2003 for two reasons. First, the Index is based on a moving
average of the previous three years. We thus believe that it does no harm to use the Index of 2003 because fundamental
changes in the level of corruption in a country evolve only slowly. The second, more importantly, is that the Index of
2003 provides information on many more countries (133 countries) than the 2002 Index (102 countries), which helped
us to minimize the number of missing values for our sample.
24 Cho and Kim (2001) provide empirical evidence to infer this assumption at least for the case of the Bank of Korea
oﬃcials. Meanwhile, one might argue that the central bank independence index can be also a possible proxy most
probably working in the opposite direction. However, we dropped the option, because, ﬁrst at a conceptual level, the
bureaucratic discretionary power in question would sometimes rise with the extent of central bank independence
instead, and also, the independence index has already been included as a fundamental variable in equation (1).suspect that countries with a relatively more discretionary central bank might experience higher
inﬂation on average than the rest of the countries ceteris paribus.
25
Inﬂationi, t=a+b}Fundamentalsi, t+l}Dummyi, t+g}Reservei, t
+q}Dummyi, t}Reservei, t+d}Timet+ei, t. (2)
Reﬁned Results: A Macro-Economic Consequence of the Reserve Fund
TABLE 4 provides the estimation results of equation (2), with ReserveM as the Reserve
variable. That is, TABLE 4 summarizes the results of varying extensions of Model 5 of
TABLE 3 by adding the alternative ʻdiscretionary countryʼ dummy and its interaction term with
ReserveM.
First, Models 1 and 2 use Dless_transparent as the ʻdiscretionary countryʼ dummy without and
with, respectively, the interaction term between Dless_transparent and ReserveM.I nM o d e l1 ,t h e
coeﬃcient of Dless_transparent is positive but not signiﬁcant while the coeﬃcient of ReserveM
turns out to be signiﬁcantly positive. In Model 2, when compared to Model 1, the coeﬃcient of
ReserveM is insigniﬁcant, while the coeﬃcient of the interaction term shows signiﬁcance with
the expected positive sign. This means that the positive eﬀect of ReserveM on inﬂation in
Model 1 is mostly from the ʻdiscretionary countriesʼ that are deﬁned through Dless_transparent.A s
for the other coeﬃcients, there is no visible change from the results of TABLE 3 except that
the coeﬃcient of Per.capita_income loses signiﬁcance.
Second, Models 3 and 4 use DLess_accountable as the ʻdiscretionary countryʼ dummy. In both
models, the coeﬃcient of DLess_accountable is signiﬁcantly positive, which implies higher inﬂation
in countries featuring ʻless accountability,ʼ as the literature would predict conventionally. The
coeﬃcient estimates of ReserveM are also signiﬁcantly positive. In Model 4, however, the
coeﬃcient of the interaction term is not signiﬁcant. Literally speaking, the interaction eﬀect of
the reserve fund with DLess_accountable appears to be limited.
Lastly, Models 5 and 6 exploit Dcorrupt as the ʻdiscretionary countryʼ dummy. Intriguingly
enough, as in the case of Dless_transparent, the coeﬃcient of Dcorrupt itself is not signiﬁcant in
spite of a strong eﬀect of ReserveM. In Model 6, the signiﬁcance of ReserveM in Model 5
disappears, and the interaction term bounces back with a signiﬁcantly positive sign.
In summary, the estimation results of TABLE 4 shed the following insights. The reserve
fund variable itself becomes insigniﬁcant when interacted with the ʻdiscretionary countryʼ
dummy, viz., either Dless_transparent or Dcorrupt, while the interaction term takes up statistical
signiﬁcance instead. As such, through both the accumulation and use of the reserve fund, we
conﬁrm the role of bureaucratic discretionary power in causing an inﬂationary bias. In this
context, we can infer that the previously positive coeﬃcients of ReserveM in Model 5 of
TABLE 3 must have ̶ at least to a nontrivial extent ̶ stemmed spuriously from the
countries with both a high value of ReserveM and substantial discretionary power. In the case of
DLess_accountable, we cannot ﬁnd such a role of bureaucratic discretion, even though the reserve
fund itself still has a positive eﬀect on inﬂation. Overall, TABLE 4 is believed to provide rather
ﬁrm evidence for our main proposition that discretionary power is in fact the driving vehicle in
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25 We are grateful to an anonymous referee for pointing out this important tenet imbedded in our panel data, and
advising the kind of a ʻdiﬀerence-in-diﬀerenceʼ model as undertaken in the text. It certainly has allowed us to test our
hypothesis more rigorously.our hypothesis.
In TABLE 5, we follow the same procedure as in TABLE 4, except that ReserveMB is
used instead for examining if we can warrant the robustness of the results in TABLE 4. In
other words, TABLE 5 extends Model 6 of TABLE 3 by including the ʻdiscretionary countryʼ
dummies in question and their interaction terms with the reserve fund. Overall, the results
equally conﬁrm the leveraging role of the bureaucratic discretion in the inﬂationary bias caused
by the reserve fund: in two out of the three cases (Dless_transparent and Dcorrupt), the interaction
term turns out to be signiﬁcantly positive (Model 2 and Model 6) . Thus, we once again
conjecture that the previously insigniﬁcant coeﬃcient estimate of ReserveMB in Model 6 of
TABLE 3 resulted mainly because we did not properly encompass the function of discretionary
power at all.
Therefore, based on the new estimation results reported in TABLEs 4 and 5, we have now















































































































Note: Standard errors are in parentheses.
*,
**,a n d
*** represent the 10%,5 %, and 1% signiﬁcance, respectively. The
























(0.012)come to a rather stronger conviction that the mixed ﬁndings concerning the reserve fund in
Models 5 and 6 of TABLE 3 were in fact due primarily to the inadequate treatment of
discretionary power in estimation. In conclusion, the empirical work thus far strongly suggests
that a larger reserve fund can cause inﬂationary bias, when institutionally coupled with
unconstrained bureaucratic discretion. Accordingly, our result, combined with the previous
literature on the US case of returning proﬁts to the Treasury, implies that ʻunconstrained
bureaucratic discretionʼ most probably causes inﬂationary bias, regardless of how the central
bank proﬁts are disposed.
IV. Conclusion
There exists peculiarity in the central bankʼs reserve fund especially in terms of its

















































































































Note: Standard errors are in parentheses.
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(0.013)declared goal. Given that academic attentions to this monetary institution were scarce, we have
investigated its macro-economic consequence. Our empirical veriﬁcation regarding the main
hypothesis indicates that monetary policy can be tampered with at the margin, when the central
bank proﬁts are retained inside as well as oppositely when they are turned in to the Treasury.
Unconstrained bureaucratic discretion has been shown to be the pivotal force underlying this
rather surprising discovery. It appears that, if there is any excessive leeway, the bureaucratsʼ
incentive always comes into play quite innovatively to maximize their own interests, regardless
of the ʻnominalʼ direction of an institutional change. In fact, this ﬁnding turns out to conform
profoundly to the proposition early made by Toma (1982, p.189) that future research eﬀorts
should be directed toward providing additional evidence concerning the importance of the
ʻdiscretionary proﬁtʼ motive of many central banks.
We therefore propose that some ʻexternalʼ changes in ʻmonetary institutionsʼ alone would
not warrant their desired ʻeconomic outcomeʼ without the bureaucratic discretion in proper
check. From the public-choice perspective, a more fundamental task to ensure the desired
eﬃciency, after all, must be the extensive scrutiny on how to balance such powers of discretion
with ʻeﬀective accountability measuresʼ and ʻincentive-compatible conditionsʼ simultaneously.
This proposition should provide a critical implication for optimally establishing the central bank
independence from not only external (political) but internal (bureaucratic) pressures in a host of
countries.
26
It is also left as a future study to examine, with varying speciﬁcs and much rigor, how the
retained reserves are being actually utilized allegedly to serve bureaucratic interests (e.g.,
discretionary loans to selected groups through discount windows). We speculate that there will
be diverse and sometimes very complicated methods of such utilization across countries,
depending on economic development, overall political accountability, interest group activities,
or more importantly, the relative discretionary power of the central bank within the entire
government sector. Such studies, however, seem to be signiﬁcantly merited.
APPENDIX
1. Collecting Procedure of the Reserve Fund Data
Our data collecting work started in 2004, but it took much longer than we had expected to complete
the reserves data. In order to get the reserve fund data for the most recent 5 years, we were ﬁrst able to
send email questionnaires to 119 central banks out of the 133 countries listed on the website of the Bank
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26 A referee, in relation to the downsides to retained proﬁts discussed so far, accordingly suggested a disciplinary
device of utilizing stocks of the central bank, speciﬁcally conjecturing that “if a majority of stocks is owned by a
central government, then the government has explicit and implicit power to urge the bank to reimburse retained
earnings for the former interest.” In fact, we also initially ﬁgured that outside stockholders of the central bank might be
able to facilitate constraints on internal discretionary. However, according to the survey of the yet relatively scant
literature such as Lybek and Morris (2004) Tuladhar (2005, p.3), and Ortiz (2009, p.11) along with our own scrutiny,
we have reached a slightly diﬀerent conclusion. First of all, the capital structure is already highly concentrated on the
central government. Nonetheless, this high concentration does not seem to become an eﬀective disciplining device
against the central bankʼs excessive discretionary power; the case is overwhelming for the worldwide trend of allowing
a very limited role to major shareholders themselves in order to preserve the autonomy of central banking. Therefore,
we submit ̶ if rather tentatively ̶ that it would be more eﬀective to include directly into the central bank law (or
bylaws), independently of stock ownership, a clause explicitly stipulating its ʻpurpose and management rule.ʼfor International Settlements (BIS, www.bis.org). We re-sent the questionnaires three to four times to the
many countries which we thought were experiencing some problem in the network. 39 central banks
ultimately replied: some with precise numbers and others with instructions to refer to their websites.
Our data-collecting task was thus forced to steer toward the Annual Report at each central bank
website. Nonetheless, we encountered two (in fact, well-expected) major obstacles: the unavailability of an
English version in many countries, and the use of diﬀerent titles and accounts for the reserve fund ﬁtting
the deﬁnition of our paper. We started from the countries which had replied with the precise numbers
earlier so as to compare them with our own website numbers, thereby acquiring acquaintance and
conﬁdence. Next, we continued to obtain the data, based on all the relevant explanations and
supplementary notes accompanied in the Annual Reports and ﬁnancial statements (e.g., the balance sheets
and the proﬁt/loss accounts) . At a later stage of this process, we additionally received central bank
oﬃcialsʼ conﬁrmation for several countries where ambiguity seemed larger concerning the reserve fund
deﬁnition.
We initially tried to collect the most recent 5-year data as of 2004. But with the passage of our
collecting time, it turned out that, before and after the two speciﬁc years (2000 and 2001), the number of
observations dropped signiﬁcantly due mainly to unavailability of ﬁnancial statements on websites and the
consistent accounting rules explained below. Also, another severe constraint was imposed, as we had to
rely on the data oﬀered in Fry et at. (2000) for the very important discretionary power proxies, Less_
transparent and Less_accountable, in our estimation. Therefore, the ﬁnal data set consists of 61 countries
for ﬁscal years 2000 and 2001.
※ A Few Representative Rules for Sampling (i.e., the Accounting Rules)
① To minimize arbitrariness, only reserve funds in the Capital and Reserve account of the Balance Sheet
are included, although a few countries list seemingly related items in other liability accounts as well.
② In countries where proﬁts are retained in the following year according to their own accounting rule, the
next yearʼs ﬁgure is recorded as the current reserve fund in our data set.
③ In a small number of countries where the ﬁscal year is not deﬁned as January to December (e.g.,
March to next February), the ﬁgure of, for example, the balance sheet at the end of February, 2001 is
recorded as the year 2000 reserve fund in our data set.
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